BRICS Summit 2026 in New Delhi

By: CA  Anil K. Jain
Chartered Accountant | Economist | Policy Researcher | Author
President – Ahimsa Foundation India
Email: CAINDIA@HOTMAIL.COM

BRICS 2026 in New Delhi highlights India’s growing role in a multipolar world. With 11 members representing nearly half the global population, BRICS seeks stronger trade, development finance, energy security and local-currency settlements. India should pursue strategic autonomy—diversifying partnerships without replacing dollar dependence with Chinese or Russian dependence.

The 18th BRICS Leaders’ Summit, being held in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, is taking place at a time of major global geopolitical and economic uncertainty. India is chairing BRICS for the fourth time under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” BRICS has expanded considerably from its original composition and now includes 11 full members and 10 partner countries. Together, its members account for roughly 49.5% of the world’s population, about 40% of global GDP and around 26% of global trade. This gives the grouping substantial economic and political importance.

The significance of the New Delhi summit lies not only in the enlarged size of BRICS but also in the global circumstances surrounding it. The world is facing continuing conflict in Ukraine, instability in West Asia, disruptions to energy supplies, intensifying US-China competition, tariff conflicts, sanctions and growing debate over the international role of the US dollar. For India, BRICS has therefore become an important instrument of strategic autonomy: a means of maintaining strong relations with the United States and Europe while simultaneously developing closer ties with Russia, the Gulf, Africa, the Global South and, where possible, China.

BRICS began as an economic concept. In 2001, economist Jim O’Neill coined the acronym “BRIC” for Brazil, Russia, India and China. Political coordination among these countries developed from 2006, and the first leaders’ summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011, turning BRIC into BRICS. A major expansion followed the 2023 Johannesburg Summit: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates joined, while Indonesia became the eleventh full member in January 2025. BRICS has thus evolved from an investment concept into a broad platform representing emerging economies and the Global South. It is neither a military alliance like NATO nor a supranational body like the European Union; it remains a consensus-based intergovernmental grouping working mainly on political-security, economic-financial and people-to-people cooperation.

The current full members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Indonesia. Ten partner countries include Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Expansion has increased BRICS’ geopolitical reach, especially because the grouping now includes major energy producers, large consumer markets and countries occupying important shipping and trade corridors. However, expansion has also created internal difficulties. India and China remain strategic competitors; Russia is in confrontation with the West; Iran and Gulf states have differing regional interests; and countries such as India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain important relations with Washington. The central challenge is therefore to increase BRICS’ influence without allowing internal differences to paralyse decision-making.

One of BRICS’ most concrete achievements has been the New Development Bank (NDB). Established after the 2014 Fortaleza Summit and operational since 2015, it has an authorised capital of US$100 billion. By the end of 2025, it had approved around US$42.9 billion for 139 projects, including transport, clean energy, water, sanitation, environmental protection and digital infrastructure. The NDB is important because BRICS members argue that the IMF and World Bank do not adequately reflect the economic weight of developing countries. BRICS therefore seeks not necessarily to destroy existing institutions but to create alternative sources of finance and press for reform of the wider multilateral system.

The 2026 summit is occurring amid four broad shifts: movement toward a more multipolar world, fragmentation of global trade through tariffs and sanctions, growing concern over financial sovereignty, and the increasing political importance of the Global South. India’s objective is to prevent BRICS from becoming an explicitly anti-American organisation while at the same time resisting excessive dependence on any one country or currency. Its preferred approach is therefore multipolarity rather than anti-Americanism.

Issues expected to be discussed in New Delhi include multilateral reform, trade and investment, food and energy security, healthcare, technology, resilient supply chains and disaster resilience. India has promoted proposals such as a BRICS Incubator Network, a BRICS Start-up Innovation Fund and a BRICS Logistics Supply-Chain Cooperation Framework. Digital connectivity, smart grids, energy storage, MSMEs, skills, employment and public health are also important elements of India’s chairmanship. Behind these developmental themes, however, lie difficult geopolitical questions involving Ukraine, West Asia, sanctions, US trade pressure, India-China relations and international payments.

The most debated economic issue is whether BRICS intends to replace the US dollar. The article stresses that there is no agreed common BRICS currency comparable to the euro, and India is not advocating an immediate end to dollar use. The more realistic objective is to increase settlement of bilateral trade in national currencies, improve interoperability between payment systems and potentially link central-bank digital currencies. India has supported greater use of local currencies and better connectivity involving systems such as UPI.

The dollar, however, cannot easily be displaced. According to the figures cited in the article, it represented about 57.13% of global allocated foreign-exchange reserves in early 2026, while total foreign-exchange reserves stood at about US$13.10 trillion. The dollar retains major advantages because of deep American financial markets, US Treasury liquidity, global banking infrastructure and the network effect created by its widespread use. Consequently, de-dollarisation is likely to be gradual rather than revolutionary. The probable future is a more plural currency system in which the dollar remains dominant while national currencies gain a larger role in bilateral and regional trade.

For India, simply replacing the dollar with the Russian rouble would be impractical. India-Russia trade expanded from around US$13 billion in 2021 to more than US$68 billion in 2024–25, mainly because of Russian oil exports to India. The relationship is highly unbalanced: Russia exports far more to India than it imports from India. This creates settlement problems because Russia may accumulate rupees that are difficult to use. Therefore, a successful rupee-rouble mechanism requires India to increase exports to Russia in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, machinery, agriculture, chemicals, automobiles, engineering and services.

A similar caution applies to the Chinese yuan. The renminbi is more internationally usable than the rouble because of China’s enormous trade and manufacturing base, but excessive use of the yuan could increase India’s strategic dependence on China. India imported roughly US$132 billion from China in 2025–26, with the trade deficit exceeding US$100 billion. Given border tensions, market-access problems and strategic competition, India should not replace dollar dependence with yuan dependence. The preferred policy is currency diversification.

India’s ideal approach is therefore a multi-currency settlement architecture. Trade with Russia could use rupees and roubles where practical; trade with the UAE could use rupees and dirhams; and other bilateral relationships could increasingly use local currencies. Digital-rupee arrangements, payment-system interoperability, central-bank swap arrangements and greater NDB lending in national currencies could reduce transaction costs and provide protection against sanctions or payment disruptions. Yet dollars and euros should continue to be used wherever they are commercially efficient. India’s objective should be optionality rather than ideological de-dollarisation.

The article also examines the impact of Donald Trump’s trade and tariff policies. Trump threatened BRICS countries with 100% tariffs if they backed a currency intended to replace the dollar, and later spoke of an additional 10% tariff against countries aligning with what he called “anti-American” BRICS policies. Such threats may unintentionally encourage countries to develop alternatives to the dollar-based financial system, because governments may fear excessive dependence on one country’s financial infrastructure.

At the same time, India cannot afford to treat the United States as an adversary. US-India trade in goods and services reached roughly US$239.6 billion in 2025, and the United States remains important for technology, services, pharmaceuticals, engineering, investment and high-value exports. India’s strategy should therefore not be framed as “America versus BRICS”. The danger is rather that unpredictable tariffs and politically conditioned trade could make international commerce more uncertain and encourage India to strengthen alternative partnerships.

For that reason, India should resist allowing BRICS to become an anti-US alliance dominated by China and Russia. India benefits simultaneously from relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, Gulf countries and the wider Global South. Its strength lies precisely in its ability to participate in BRICS, the G20 and the Quad while maintaining ties across competing geopolitical blocs. If BRICS becomes a practical mechanism for development finance, digital payments, food and energy security, supply-chain diversification and institutional reform, India’s influence will grow.

India-China relations and energy security are also critical. Bilateral India-China trade is around US$155 billion, although India continues to run a very large deficit. BRICS may provide a platform for stabilising relations without ignoring underlying strategic disputes. Energy is equally important: Russia has at times supplied a very large share of India’s crude imports, while instability in West Asia has demonstrated India’s vulnerability to price shocks. The article notes Brent crude approaching US$110 per barrel and the rupee weakening to about ₹95.7 per US dollar on 11 September 2026.

In the long term, BRICS could help India diversify export markets, attract investment, gradually internationalise the rupee, develop alternative payment systems and press for reform of institutions such as the UN Security Council, IMF and World Bank. India’s strengths in UPI and digital public infrastructure could also allow it to shape future cross-border payments. Successful management of BRICS would reinforce India’s position as an independent pole in a multipolar world.

The article’s central conclusion is that India should avoid both pro-American dependence and anti-American BRICS alignment. It should pursue strategic autonomy supported by economic strength. India should use dollars where efficient, local currencies where practical, cooperate with Russia without becoming dependent on Russia, engage China without becoming economically subordinate to China, and maintain strong relations with the United States without surrendering foreign-policy independence. The long-term importance of the New Delhi summit may therefore lie not in creating a BRICS currency but in giving countries such as India multiple economic, financial and diplomatic options instead of dependence on a single centre of global power.